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At first glance, it would seem that Russian legislation on 
securing the right to defend oneself during criminal 
proceedings conforms to international standards, because the 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation contains the right of access to qualified 
legal assistance, which may be at no cost to the defendant. 
However, obstacles do arise in asserting the right to a defence 
in criminal proceedings in Russia, often related to the failure of 
Russian laws or developing jurisprudence to conform to 
international norms. One such area of serious discrepancy is 
the way in which Article 48 of the Russian Constitution and 
Article 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code are interpreted and 
applied. 
In criminal proceedings, the right to a defence should be seen 
as inseparable from the right to collaboration in such legal 
defence, which means the right to the assistance of a defence 
lawyer or representative. 
Article 48 of the Constitution provides that ‘each person is 
guaranteed the right to receive qualified legal assistance’. In 
the cases provided by the law, legal assistance is rendered 
without charge. Each person who has been detained, taken into 
custody or accused of a crime has the right to seek the 
assistance of an attorney (a defence lawyer) from the moment 
of such detention, taking into custody or accusation. 
Part I of Article 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code establishes 
that: ‘A defence lawyer is a person who carries out, in the 
manner established by this Code, the defence of the rights and 
interests of a suspect or defendant, and affords them legal 
assistance during the criminal process.’ 
As a general rule, the interests of a defendant in criminal 
proceedings are represented by a lawyer. But according to 
para 2 of Article 49 of the CPC, another type of person can be 
permitted alongside the lawyer, in the capacity of a defender: 
‘Lawyers are admitted as defenders. By determination or order 
of the judge, alongside the lawyer can be admitted one of the 
defendant’s close relatives or any other person for whom the 
defendant petitions. In the work of a Justice of the Peace, such 
a person can be admitted instead of a lawyer.’ 
‘Another defender’, for example, could in practice be a legal 
expert who is fully competent and familiar with the matter at 
hand, but who does not have the status of a lawyer; or a legal 
expert with specialist knowledge and experience – such as in 
the field of the international defence of human rights. 
An accused could consider that a lawyer’s assistance is 
inadequate, for example, where the lawyer has no training in 
the field of international human rights, and the accused submits 
a motion to the judge for the admission of another person as his 
defender, one who has no status as a lawyer, but who has such 
specialised knowledge. “Insofar as none of my lawyers have 
specialised knowledge in the field of international defence of 
human rights, and the government is not able to provide me 
with such a lawyer, I ask you to admit as one of my defenders 
the legal expert D., to collaborate with me in securing my right 
to qualified legal assistance and the right to approach 
international legal bodies.” – this is how one of my clients 
addressed a motion to the court. 
It is understandable that Article 49 of the CPC envisages the 
admission of another defender in the criminal process only 
alongside a lawyer. The state is required to guarantee the 
provision of qualified legal assistance, and the only system in 
existence – while somewhat reminiscent of the system of 
control by government bodies over the qualifying of practising 
legal experts – is membership of the legal bar, with its legally 
prescribed procedure for taking exams. The same law defines 
the activity of lawyers as ‘qualified legal assistance, afforded 
on a professional basis by persons who have attained the status 
of lawyers.’ 
Another defender appears as a supplementary means of 
defence, and the right of a defendant to this supplementary 
means of defence is provided by the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Now we will turn our attention to the wording of Part 2 of 
Article 49 of the CPC: other persons ‘. . . may be admitted’, 
which literally means ‘or may not be admitted.’ 
If the judge grants the defendant’s motion and admits another 
person as a defender, by issuing an order, no questions arise, 
the defender is availed of rights provided for him in the 
Russian Criminal Procedure Code. But what about the 
situation where a judge refuses to admit such a defender? 
We note that the procedure for admitting a defender is defined 
in the Criminal Procedure Code: by order of the judge. But the 
Code does not oblige the judge to issue an opinion explaining 
an order to refuse admission of a defender. Judges happily 
take advantage of this, writing ‘denied’ on an application for a 
defender to be admitted; or, if the motion for admission of 
another person as defender is filed during court proceedings, 
they state that “the Court, having deliberated the matter in open 
session, has decided to deny the motion”, thus issuing their 
decision on the record. This means that the refusal to admit 
someone as a defender cannot be appealed. 
In addition, the Article gives the judge unlimited discretionary 
powers to refuse to admit another person as a defender: firstly, 
because the Article contains no examples, criteria or guidance 
as to when it is appropriate or inappropriate to deny such a 
request; and secondly, because the Article does not oblige 
judges to explain their denial. This is a very serious omission, 
making the Article into nothing more than a licence for 
arbitrary actions by judges. ‘Other persons may be admitted or 
may not be admitted, but anyway what is the difference, after 
all, there is the right to a lawyer, and at no cost’, this was how 
it was calmly expressed to me by one of the highest officials of 
the provincial court. What was most alarming is that his 
statement did not violate the standard of the CPC. Article 49 
of the CPC allows him to use this kind of reasoning. I don’t want 
to accuse judges of maliciously refusing to admit to the judicial 
process all legal experts other than lawyers. However, based on 
the content of Part 2 of Article 49 of the CPC, a judge decides a 
question regarding a person’s right to a defence, using his own 
subjective evaluation of the reasonableness of such an admission. 
As has already been noted, the Article does not contain even the 
most formal guidelines – such as whether the judge should assess 
the qualifications of another defender and draw conclusions 
correspondingly; whether the judge should consider such factors 
as the category of the crime of which the defendant has been 
accused; whether it is a private or public lawyer who is providing 
his defence, and so on. Unfortunately, when judges are deciding 
such questions, they are more often guided by the popular 
understanding of law: ‘you already have a lawyer, why should 
you need a legal expert from a voluntary organisation?, why do 
you need an international legal expert in the court of first 
instance? When you apply to the European Court, that will be the 
time to ask for such a legal expert to be admitted . . .’ 
Consider the situation when the hearing in the court of first 
instance is over, the verdict has been pronounced. The client is in 
investigative solitary confinement, and is preparing to submit a 
cassation appeal against the verdict. Once again, along with the 
assistance of the lawyer, the convicted person would like another 
defender. This may be for many reasons: he may not be happy 
with the quality of the lawyer’s work, or he may be planning to 
approach international bodies in the future defence of his rights. 
In the latter case, it is essential at the appellate stage to indicate 
competently those violations of the person’s rights that are 
guaranteed by international instruments, so as to observe the 
principle of exhaustion of domestic legal remedies, as established 
by both the European Convention on Human Rights and by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Once again, the same problem arises. ‘Another defender’ has no 
opportunity to meet with his or her client and discuss the process 
of writing the cassation appeal and other procedural documents, 
since he is not admitted into the isolation cell. In that case, the 
convicted person and the potential defender are obliged to turn to 
the Court that issued the verdict, to ask it to admit the desired 
person as a defender. At this point a wide range of obstacles can 
be produced against the admission of another defender. One 
judge, carefully reading Article 49 of the CPC, will announce that 
it applies only to judicial hearing processes, and that it is 
impossible to admit a defender when they are not in progress. My 
client and I were told to approach the cassation court with a 
motion to be admitted. The cassation appeals court indicated that 
I should bring this motion in the course of the cassation appeal 
hearing. 
In another case, the court admits another person as a defender, but 
does not issue a ruling on it, indicating again that a ruling is 
issued only in connection with admission to a hearing; at the 
current stage, the court issues a pass into the isolation cell. It is 
then the turn of the staff of the isolation block to glance at the 
CPC, and use Article 49 to refuse the defender access to the 
person in custody. The reasons given are (a) that a pass from the 
Sverdlovsk provincial court is not binding on the SIZO 
(institution of confinement pending sentencing); (b) there is no 
written ruling from the judge, without which admission of another 
person as a defender is not possible, within the 
meaning of Article 49 of the CPC. 
Apart from anything else, someone who is under investigation or 
who has been convicted, having no access to a particular legal 
expert that he has specially chosen for the purpose, is deprived of 
the possibility effectively to defend his rights in international 
forums. It is no secret that the procedure for applying to 
international bodies is quite complex. For the complaint to be 
acceptable, a person may need to consult with a specialist. As 
already indicated, such a specialist does not have to be a lawyer. 
He or she could be a legal expert from a voluntary organisation or 
a teacher of law. But in this case, how is a person in custody to 
obtain such a consultation or a specialist to provide it (so that a 
competent and effective document can be prepared), if access to 
the person in custody is denied? It is clear that such impediments 
also constitute a violation of the right to a legal defence in 
international forums – after all, Article 34 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights directly provides that ‘The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way with the 
effective exercise of this right.’ 
It is important to note that, in practice, judges and SIZO staff, 
along with prosecutor’s offices charged with monitoring the 
observance of laws in places of custody, are extending the 
application of Article 49 of the CPC (restricting freedom of access 
to suspects and convicted criminals to lawyers only) to those 
cases emanating from a suspect or a convicted criminal in civil 
courts as well. In other words, a person who is not in prison has 
the right to authorise anyone to represent his interests in a civil 
matter, but the possibility for a suspect or someone who has been 
convicted to choose a defender is once again limited to 
lawyers. Of course, a form of authority will be accepted for a 
non-lawyer in a civil court, but the legal specialist will have no 
opportunity to discuss the case with the client, nor to report on his 
conduct of the case, because his form of authority in a civil matter 
will still not gain him access to the SIZO. This is a serious 
obstacle to realising one’s right of access to justice in civil 
matters, remembering that part of a civil court’s work includes the 
consideration of complaints by inmates of SIZOs concerning 
violations of their rights by the institution management, and 
complaints about the conditions of their custody. 
As strange as it may seem, the source of the problem in the 
situation described above is the non-compliance of Article 48 of 
the Russian Constitution with international norms. Both Article 
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 6 of the European Convention provide the right for 
persons to defend themselves by means of ‘a defender of their 
choosing.’ The Russian Constitution contains no reference to a 
defender of choice, resulting in a corresponding interpretation of 
the Article by agencies applying the law. The Secretariat of the 
Russian Constitutional Court, in response to a complaint to the 
Russian Constitutional Court indicated that “ . . . Part 2 of Article 
49 of the Russian CPC does not restrict a citizen’s right to receive 
qualified legal assistance. The right of independent choice of a 
lawyer (defender) does not mean the right to choose as a defender 
any person at all at the discretion of the suspect or accused . . .”. 
However, remembering the content of part 4 of Article 15 of the 
Russian Constitution; of the Federal Law ‘On Ratification of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’; of the 
Resolution of the Plenum of the Russian Supreme Court of 10th 
October 2003 ‘On the Application by Judges of the general 
jurisdiction of universally recognised principles and of norms of 
international law and international treaties of the Russian 
Federation’, it is necessary to draw a different conclusion. The 
right to a defender of one’s choice is guaranteed by international 
instruments, and it is submitted that Article 48 of the Russian 
Constitution should be interpreted in the light of international 
obligations of the Russian Federation for the defence of human 
rights. 
